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International Journal of Constitutional Law 2006 4(2):392-410; doi:10.1093/icon/mol010
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© The Author 2006. Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The central-local division of power in the Americas and renewed Mexican federalism: Old institutions, new political realities

Jorge A. Schiavon*

* Professor of International Relations and Secretary-General, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico City. E-mail: jorge.schiavon{at}cide.edu

This paper explores whether the central-local division of power is an important constitutional variable in the political systems of the Americas. It develops a typology of the different kinds of central-local division based on the two specific characteristics differentiating them (federal-unitary and centralized-decentralized). It then constructs a "veto gates and players" model in order to analyze the causal mechanism through which the central-local division of power impacts the constitutional systems, followed by two case studies to support the argument that federalism matters when combined with decentralization (measured through the subnational share of expenditure) and partisan fragmentation in the system (number and nature of political parties). In the process, I analyze the Mexican federal system, arguing that renewed Mexican federalism is a function of the combination of old federal institutions, established in 1917, with the new political distribution of power and decentralization after the 2000 democratic transition.


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