Constitutional afterlife: The continuing impact of Thailand's postpolitical constitution
* Professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Nick Chapleau for excellent research assistance on this article and Jacob Ricks for helpful comments. Thanks also to Andrew Harding, Peter Leyland, Georg Schlucter, Kittisak Prokati, and Ajarn Sulak Sivaraksa, whose generous conversations over the years have immeasurably helped my understanding of Siamese constitutionalism. Email: tginsburg{at}uchicago.edu
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Abstract |
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Thailand's constitution of 1997 introduced profound changes into the country's governance, creating a "postpolitical" democratic structure in which an intricate array of guardian institutions served to limit the role of elected politicians. Ultimately, the constitutional structure was undermined in a military coup against populist billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, who had taken over many of the institutions designed to constrain political power. Nonetheless, the 1997 constitution appears to be having a significant afterlife, in that its institutional innovations have survived the enactment of a new Constitution and continue to constrain the political process. This article describes the Thai situation and speculates on the conditions for constitutional afterlife.